In this paper, we analyze a knapsack schemes. The one is suggested by Su, which is relied on a new method entitled permutation combination method. We demonstrate that this permutation method is useless to the security of the scheme. Since the special super increasing construction, we can break this scheme employ the algorithm provided by Shamir scheme. Finally, we provide an enhanced version of Su scheme to avoid these attacks.
INTRODUCTION
HE knapsack problem is a well-known NP-complete problem. This problem is declared by provided positive integer elements . The difficulty of knapsack system motivated many public key schemes in the eighties, following the influential work of Merkle and Hellman [1] . Though the underlying problem is NP-complete, it has astonishingly been broken by Shamir [2] since of the special construction of the secret key. Later, many variants have been demonstrated insecure for practical applications by lattice reduction methods [3] , also, Baocang Wang, Hui Liu and Yupu Hu [4] reported that common knapsack can be solved under the actuality of an Oracle when the density
, which is widespread by Coster [5, 6] to 9408 . 0 . In fact, we can employ the celebrated LLL method [7, 8] instead of the Oracle in practical parameters. But, most of suggested knapsack systems have been broken except Okamoto, Tanaka and Uchiyama, quantum knapsack scheme [9] . Either by special construction for example Merkle and Hellman scheme and Chor and Rivest scheme [10] . To make sure of the challenge of low-density attack, it is proposed that the density d should be bigger than 9408 . 0 [5, 11] . Lately, some knapsack schemes with high density have suggested [12, 13] .
In this paper, we study a Su knapsack scheme [14] . This scheme considered a new permutation method entitled permutation combination method, by developing this method to avoid the low-density attack. We demonstrate that the permutation method is useless to avoid the low-density attack and the density of knapsack sequence is lesser than 9408 . 0 . But, when we employ the lowdensity scheme, the dimension of the lattice is 1025, which is very large to employ LLL method [7] . Since of the special super increasing construction, we can get equal secret keys by Shamir scheme. We demonstrate that one can decrypt the message if he can solve a knapsack scheme such as the Merkle and Hellman scheme. In this paper, we study Shamir attack on the basic Merkle and Hellman knapsack scheme. Initially, we provide a concise description of the pioneering Merkle and Hellman knapsack scheme. The sender selects a super increasing vector ) ,..., , ( bits. However the length of the difference of two such terms to be 6  n bits, which requires certain special construction. Shamir core contribution was to observe that j i k can be found in polynomial time by invoking Lenstra theorem that the integer programming problem in a determined number of variables can be solved in polynomial time [2] . But, the cryptanalyst must invoke 
LOW DENSITY ATTACKS
In this section, we will present the low density attack suggested by Coster [5] which is the modification of Lagarias and Odlyzko attack [4] . The knapsack system is declared as follows: For provided positive integers n a a ,..., 1 and s obtain variables 
DESCRIPTION OF SU SCHEME
We will depict the Su scheme [14] which is relied on the use of the elliptic curve logarithm problem and knapsack problem as follows: In first stage, the user chooses the elliptic curve domain elements. it is difficult to calculate the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study a new scheme relied on knapsack system. The security level of the encryption scheme is overestimated. We can break Su scheme employ Shamir scheme and decrypt the message of the scheme.
